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Abstract 
Simultaneity bias complicates the estimation of the causal effect of motorcycle helmet 
usage on fatalities. We overcome this obstacle by exploiting an exogenous variation in the 
enforcement of the motorcycle helmet usage law between two municipalities in Uruguay. 
We show evidence of a dramatic increase in helmet usage in one municipality after the 
law was enforced. In just one month, usage increased from less than 10% to more than 
90%. Our difference in difference estimates show that helmet usage laws are associated 
with a significant decrease in injuries and fatalities.  
Resumen ejecutivo 
¿Es efectivo el uso del casco para reducir la gravedad de las lesiones? La literatura 
científica internacional ha estudiado este tema pero sólo para países 
desarrollados. En América Latina, los accidentes de tránsito son la principal 
causa de fallecimientos entre los jóvenes de 15 a 29 años. Uruguay es un país 
particularmente relevante: mientras Canadá, Finlandia y España presentan tasas 
de muertes por accidentes de tránsito de 0,7 cada 100 mil habitantes, Uruguay 
tiene una tasa de 8,8 (magnitud representativa de los países latinoamericanos, a 
excepción de Chile). Aprovechando la discontinuidad en la obligatoriedad del 
casco entre dos departamentos de Uruguay, encontramos, empleando una 
metodología de diferencias-en-diferencias, que el uso del casco logra reducir las 
lesiones graves y muertes en motociclistas en un 57%. Concluimos el estudio 
mostrando la robustez de los resultados y haciendo un análisis de los costos y 
beneficios monetarios de implementar la obligatoriedad del uso del casco.     
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1. Introduction 
According to the World Health Organization5, 1.25 million people die each year as a 
result of road traffic crashes. Road traffic injuries are the first cause of death among 
people aged between 15 and 29 years. Almost half of those dying on the world’s roads 
are “vulnerable road users”: pedestrians, cyclists, and motorcyclists.  
In the absence of constant action, road traffic crashes are predicted to become the seventh 
leading cause of death by 2030. However, the newly adopted 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development has set an ambitious target of halving the global number of 
deaths and injuries from road traffic crashes by 2020. 
There is a great heterogeneity in terms of rates of motorcycle fatalities among countries. 
Table 1 reports that Uruguay shows one of the worst rates in motorcycle accidents.  
 
Table 1 - Rate of fatalities in motorcycle accidents  
Rate per hundred thousand of fatalities in Motorized two-wheelers accidents6. 
Country 2014  
Canada 0,5 
0 - 1,5 
Denmark  0,5 
Finland 0,5 
Israel  0,5 
Switzerland 0,7 
Germany  0,8 
Japan 0,8 
Lithuania  0,8 
Spain 0,8 
Chile 0,9 
Australia 1,0 
Hungary 1,1 
France  1,2 
United States 1,6 
1,5 - 3 Korea 2,0 
Greece  3,0 
Guyana  3,2 
3 – 4,5 
Marocco 4,4 
Guatemala 4,8 
4,5 - 6 
China 5,1 
Brazil 6,6 
6 – 7,5 
Colombia 7,4 
Uganda 8,4 
7,5 - 9 
Uruguay 8,8 
                                                          
5 See more: http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs358/en/ 
6 Source: http://roads.live.kiln.digital/?lang=es#deaths  
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Paraguay 11,2 
9 + 
Cambodia 12,3 
Malaysia 14,9 
Thailand 26,3 
 
In this study, we present new evidence on the effectiveness of both motorcycle helmets 
and state laws that mandate their use. 
We study the causal effect of mandatory helmet usage laws on fatalities in motorcycle 
accidents, using a natural experiment in Uruguay. A sharp change in the enforcement of 
the law in one municipality, and not in another one, allows us to work with a difference-
in-difference framework. The enforcement of the law lead to a stunning increase in 
helmet usage (from less than 10% to more than 90% in just one month). This exogenous 
variation significantly reduced the probability of seriously injured or fatalities by 8.7 
percentage points, a 57% reduction relative to the control group. We also find that this 
reduction goes hand in hand with an increase in the percentage of slightly injured, while 
the percentage of unharmed and the total number of motorcycle accidents didn´t change. 
Our results have policy implications regarding the effects of enforcing helmet usage laws 
on the health of the population. 
The effectiveness of the motorcycle helmet at reducing the severity of injuries might 
seem uncontroversial. However, several factors could challenge the anticipated health 
benefits. First, the “Peltzman hypothesis” suggests that health benefits of helmet use 
might be attenuated by compensating changes in other risky driving behaviors 
(Peltzman, 1975). In other words, if drivers are compelled to wear a helmet, they may 
adjust their risk-taking on other margins (e.g., speed and braking distance). Second, the 
beneficial effects of the helmet use may be attenuated because motorcyclists, even in the 
absence of a helmet law, may already tend to use helmets in circumstances where they 
are most effective. That is, helmet laws may encourage helmet use on margins where 
they are least effective. Third, motorcycle helmet use might decrease rider vision and the 
time of reaction, and so increase both the likelihood and the severity of injuries (Liu et 
al., 2008). Fourth, helmet use may be ineffective at preventing injuries in the most serious 
crashes simply because the bodies of motorcyclists are otherwise so exposed (Dee, 2009). 
Fifth, the weight of a helmet might exacerbate certain types of injuries (i.e. those in the 
neck) (Dee, 2009). Sixth, ideologies that emphasize the value of individual choice make 
that helmet laws lead to a loss in personal utility that is non-trivial (Homer and French, 
2009).  
Also, though some literature shows that helmets decrease the probability to suffer 
injuries or fatalities (Branas, and Knudson, 2001; Ichikawa, Chadbunchachai, and Marui, 
2003; Liu et al, 2008; Keng, 2005; Peng et al, 2017), it was no able to cope with endogeneity 
(those riders who use helmets may be also more careful at driving).  
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Peng et al. (2017) provides a broad literature review of recent research on the effects of 
helmets laws in USA. A total of 60 U.S. studies qualified for inclusion in their review. 
Implementing universal helmet laws increased helmet use (median, 47 percentage 
points); reduced total deaths (median, –32%) and deaths per registered motorcycle 
(median, –29%); and reduced total injuries (median, –32%) and injuries per registered 
motorcycle (median, –24%). Repealing universal helmet laws decreased helmet use 
(median, –39 percentage points); increased total deaths (median, 42%) and deaths per 
registered motorcycle (median, 24%); and increased total injuries (median, 41%) and 
injuries per registered motorcycle (median, 8%). 
There was great variation in study designs and quality. In general, the methodological 
quality was poor. Most studies were either affected by selection bias or had the potential 
for this to influence their results. The majority of identified studies were cross-sectional 
designs that examined one or more of the outcomes (head injury, mortality, and facial 
injury or neck injury) in relation to helmet use, with a large number that only take into 
consideration fatalities, and not serious injuries. Most studies were based on populations 
from developed countries.  
There are two papers from the economic literature more closely related to our work. Dee 
(2009) studies the effectiveness of helmet use and state laws that mandate helmet use in 
reducing motorcyclist fatalities. Using a within-vehicle fixed effect estimation, he finds 
that the technological effect of helmet use is a reduction of fatality risk by 34%. He also 
finds that state laws requiring helmet use appear to reduce motorcyclist fatalities by 27%. 
French, Gumus and Homer (2009) study the effectiveness of traffic policies in reducing 
motorcycle fatalities. Using state level data from 1990 to 2005, they find that universal 
helmet laws led to a 24% reduction in fatal motorcycle injuries. Both studies use data 
from the United States, where the rate of fatalities in motorcycle accidents is much 
smaller than in developing countries (Table 1). In particular, the Uruguayan rate is more 
than 5.5 times higher than in USA. Thus, our study may provide a more relevant estimate 
of the impact of universal helmet laws for developing countries, where the prevalence 
of deaths from motorcycle accidents is higher.  
 
2. Background 
Why is helmet needed? 
As stated by the World Health Organization during a motorcycle or bicycle crash there 
are two main mechanisms that cause brain traumas: the direct contact and the 
acceleration and deceleration. 
When a motorcycle or bicycle is involved in a collision, the rider is often thrown from 
the cycle. The motorcyclist that does not use helmet has a higher risk of suffering some 
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kind of traumatic brain injury or a combination of it. Helmets create an additional layer 
for the head and thus protect the wearer from some of the more severe forms of traumatic 
brain injury 
A helmet works in three ways. In the first place, it reduces the deceleration of the skull, 
and hence the brain movement, by managing the impact. The soft material incorporated 
in the helmet absorbs some of the impact and therefore the head comes to a halt more 
slowly. This means that the brain does not hit the skull with such great force. Secondly, 
it spreads the forces of the impact over a greater surface area so that they are not 
concentrated on particular areas of the skull. Finally, it prevents direct contact between 
the skull and the impacting object by acting as a mechanical barrier between the head 
and the object. These three functions are met, by combining the properties of four basic 
components of the helmets: The shell is the strong outer surface of the helmet that 
distributes the impact over a large surface area, and therefore lessens the force before it 
reaches the head. The impact-absorbing liner, which is made of a soft, crushable padded 
material, this dense layer cushions and absorbs the shock as the helmet stops and the 
head tries to continue moving. The comfort padding is the soft foam-and-cloth layer that 
sits next to the head. It helps keep the head comfortable and the helmet fitting snugly. 
The retention system, or chin strap is the mechanism that keeps the helmet on the head in 
a crash.  
Riders who do not wear helmets place additional costs on hospitals, as consequence of 
staying in the hospital longer, greatest number of medical and surgical interventions and 
recovery time, while the disability that results from these head injuries incurs costs at an 
individual, family and societal level7. 
 
TABLE 2 – PROBABILITY OF SERIOUS INJURY USING HELMET  
Dependent variable: Serious injury 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Logit coeff Logit coeff Odd ratio Odd ratio 
     
Helmet -0.391*** -0.429*** 0.676*** 0.651*** 
 (0.141) (0.162) (0.0952) (0.105) 
Constant -2.449*** -3.181*** 0.0864*** 0.0415*** 
 (0.0716) (1.115) (0.00618) (0.0463) 
Observations 3,972 2,994 3,972 2,994 
Controls No Yes No Yes 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: UNASEV (Unidad Nacional de Seguridad Vial, Uruguay). 
Data: period 2013-2015 
Notes: All regressions are run at the individual level. Helmet is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 
if the person involved in the accident was wearing a helmet. Controls include a dummy for school 
                                                          
7 “Helmets: A road safety manual for decision-makers and practitioners”. – World health 
organization  
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and public holidays; the interaction of hour with day; year and week of the accident. Standard errors 
are in parentheses. 
 
In Table 2 we show, using our data, that the usage of a helmet is correlated with a 
significant reduction in the probability of being seriously injured in motorcycle 
accidents. Nonetheless, these estimates do not account for the endogeneity of using a 
helmet. A motorcyclist takes several decisions when he is going to ride his motorcycle: 
the speed, stopping at street crossings, respecting traffic signs, whether or not he is 
going to drive under the effects of alcohol or drugs, and if he will be wearing a helmet. 
Thus, helmet usage is an (endogenous) choice variable. Riders who decide to use a 
helmet self-select themselves into the treatment, so there can be unobservable factors 
that confound the use of a helmet and the severity of an accident. In the next sections of 
the paper we will try to estimate the causal effect of using a helmet on the probability 
of serious injuries and fatalities.  
 
The Uruguayan natural experiment 
On November 2007, the parliament approved law No. 18.191, the National Law of 
Traffic, becoming mandatory wearing helmet for the users of motorcycles, at national 
level. However, neither Mercedes -the capital city of Soriano- nor Melo -the capital city 
of Cerro Largo- decided to monitor the use of helmet, not following the national law of 
road safety, arguing that transit issues respond to departmental jurisdiction as 
propounded in the Constitution. As Table 3 reports, the percentage of people using 
helmet over the people affected by an accident was 7.9% and 21.2% for Soriano and Cerro 
Largo (two out of 19 departments of Uruguay) respectively. There is variation between 
the different cities of the same department. Moreover, the usage of helmet was smaller 
(almost non-existent) in the cities of Mercedes and Melo than in the rest of the cities of 
their department, with respectively 3.1% and 5.7%. These will be our pre-treatment 
helmet usage figures.  
Table 3 
 
January-
July 2013 
Soriano 7,9% 
(Mercedes) (3.1%) 
Cerro Largo 21,2% 
(Melo) (5.7%) 
Canelones 53,7% 
Colonia 55,4% 
Durazno 59,8% 
Paysandú  69,4% 
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Tacuarembó  70,1% 
San José  71,7% 
Rocha 80,6% 
Flores  83,7% 
Montevideo  84,1% 
Treinta y Tres 85,0% 
Maldonado 87,8% 
Florida  88,0% 
Rio Negro  89,3% 
Lavalleja  90,4% 
Salto  90,7% 
Artigas  94,9% 
Rivera  96,1% 
 
On August 2013, Parliament approved law No. 19.120 – the Misdemeanors Act, which 
include an article establishing a punishment for not using the helmet, consisting of 
community work. The police are responsible for enforcing it, due to it is a national level 
law. Since the misdemeanors act was approved, the Mayor of Soriano gradually let 
people know that he would enforce the national law of traffic employing the 
misdemeanors act. Based on that, on November 1, 2013, the municipality of Soriano 
starts monitoring the use of helmet, while Cerro Largo remained steadfast in its position 
of not follow the national law of road safety.  
We take as our pre-treatment moment the period January – July 2013 because, during 
this sample period, the Mayor of Soriano did not make any statement nor deliver any 
hint in favor of the application of the national law of traffic. 
 
Preliminary version 
 
8 
 
FIGURE 1 – PERCENTEGE OF PEOPLE WEARING HELMET IN MOTORCYCLE ACCIDENTS 
 
Notes: By locality, monthly average of the percentage of people wearing helmet in motorcycle accidents. 
The black vertical line indicates the starting of the treatment.  
 
We concentrate our analysis in Mercedes and Melo, that is, the capitals of Soriano 
and Cerro Largo respectively, which are the most populated urban regions of 
these two departments of Uruguay. Figure 1 shows a stunning increase in the 
usage of helmets after the law was enforced. It is remarkable how motorcycle 
riders started wearing helmets as a result of the policy change. We think that this 
dramatic increase in usage is exogenous and not correlated with riders’ 
preferences on health nor on riding style or other unobservable variables. This 
increase in usage will be the source of exogenous variation for our main 
estimates.  
Finally, we should note that data on helmet usage is not self-reported: it comes 
from actual accidents where police verifies helmet usage. So Figure 1 accurately 
reflects the usage of helmet in our Treatment and Control municipalities.  
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3. Data 
The data used in this report is drawn mainly from the database of UNASEV (Unidad 
Nacional de Seguridad Vial / National Division of Road Security). The database has 
detailed information, about the accidents where police intervened, on the date, hour and 
location of the accident. The database includes information about the people involved in 
the accident, such as age, gender, role in the accident: if the person was passenger or 
driver, reason of the accident, consequence of the accident: death, serious injury, slight 
injury or unharmed, and if the person wears helmet or seat belt if applicable. While the 
report is filled by the police that intervened in the accident, the variable that explains the 
consequence of the accident is filled by the medical assistance. They are the responsible 
to identify if the person is slightly or seriously injured, and the difference lies in if the 
person has vital organs compromised. Regarding to the death as consequence of the 
accident, the dataset specify if the fatality is where the accident took place or at the 
medical center, and, in the latter, it counts if the person dies 30 days counting forward 
from the day of the accident 
In addition to the main dataset, we collect daily time of sunset information, to create a 
dichotomous variable equals one, if the accident occurs at night. Additionally we collect 
daily holiday’s information that include national holidays, as well as school holidays, 
which could potentially affect both traffic volume and accidents. Table 4 displays the 
definition of key variables in the dataset. 
 
 
TABLE 4 - DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
Variables  Definition 
Night 
Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the accident occurs during 
the night. 
Helmet 
Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the person involved wears 
helmet. 
Holiday  
Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the day of the accident is a 
school or public holiday. 
Hour* Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the hour of the accident is *. 
Day* Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the day of the accident is *. 
Week* Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the week of the accident is *. 
Year* Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the year of the accident is *. 
Seriously injured or killed 
By motorcycle, the number of seriously injured or killed where 
the accident took place or at the medical center. 
Mercedes  
Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the accident took place in the 
locality of Mercedes. 
Melo 
Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the accident took place in the 
locality of Melo.  
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3.2. Description of localities  
 
TABLE 5 – DESCRIPTION OF LOCALITIES 
 Mercedes Melo 
   
Total population 41,974 51,830 
   
Total number of 
motorcycle or moped 
45,157 44,181 
   
Total number of 
automobile or van 
14,956 19,179 
   
Number of motorcycle 
or moped per capita 
1.076 0.852 
   
Number of automobile 
or van per capita 
0.356 0.370 
Notes: Data by Nacional Census 2011. 
  
 
 
FIGURE 2 - PEOPLE AFFECTED BY A MOTORCYCLE ACCIDENT (percentage by 
hour of the day) 
Panel A. Mercedes 
 
Panel B. Melo  
 
Notes: The blue bars show the percentage per hour of people affected by a motorcycle 
accident in the pre-treatment period January – July 2013.  
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FIGURE 3 - PEOPLE AFFECTED BY A MOTORCYCLE ACCIDENT (percentage by 
day of the week) 
Panel A. Mercedes  
 
 
Panel B. Melo  
 
 
Notes: The blue bars show the percentage per day of people affected by a motorcycle 
accident in the pre-treatment period January – July 2013.  
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the distribution of people affected by a motorcycle accident 
across time and space. We observe that the percentage of people affected by a motorcycle 
accident does not have a wide variation among days of the week, especially in the 
location of Melo. However it presents a variation regarding the hours of the day. In both 
localities we observe a three pronounced spikes, at noon, mid-afternoon and late-
afternoon; still there is not at the same hour in both localities.  
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FIGURE 4 – HEAT MAP OF ROAD ACCIDENTS  
Panel A. Melo 
 
Panel B. Mercedes 
 
Notes: Colors indicates de density of road traffic accidents that involves motorcycles, 
being red high density, yellow medium density and blue low density, in the pre-
treatment period January – July 2013. Data obtained from UNASEV.  
In figure 4, we show that the distribution of the accident on both localities is not 
homogeneous.   
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TABLE 6 – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS of MOTORCYCLE ACCIDENTS at PRE-
TREATMENT 
Variables 
Mercedes Melo  
Mean SD Obs. Mean SD Obs. 
Mean 
Differences 
Age 31.624 16.113 221 28.136 14.333 243 -3.489** 
       (-2.47) 
        
Unharmed 0.362 0.482 229 0.202 0.402 248 -0.161*** 
       (-3.97) 
        
Slight injury 0.559 0.498 229 0.746 0.436 248 0.187*** 
       (4.37) 
        
Serious injury 0.079 0.270 229 0.044 0.206 248 -0.0342 
       (-1.56) 
        
Fatalities  0.000 0.000 229 0.008 0.090 248 0.00806 
       (1.36) 
        
Accidents at night 0.319 0.467 229 0.242 0.429 248 -0.0768* 
       (-1.87) 
        
Male 0.629 0.484 229 0.652 0.477 247 0.0230 
       (0.52) 
        
Run over an animal 0.000 0.000 229 0.069 0.253 248 0.0685*** 
       (4.10) 
        
Run over a pedestrian 0.031 0.173 229 0.028 0.166 248 -0.00234 
       (-0.15) 
        
Fall over 0.205 0.405 229 0.173 0.379 248 -0.0319 
       (-0.89) 
        
Single-vehicle collision 
(excludes run-off-road) 
0.031 0.173 229 0.016 0.126 248 -0.0144 
       (-1.05) 
        
Collision  
(between vehicles) 
0.734 0.443 229 0.710 0.455 248 -0.0239 
       (-0.58) 
        
Run-off-road collisions 0.000 0.000 229 0.004 0.064 248 0.00403 
       (0.96) 
        
Helmet 0.031 0.173 229 0.057 0.232 246 0.0263 
       (1.40) 
        
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Notes: Table lists the mean difference between the locality of Mercedes and Melo, in the pre-
treatment period January – July 2013. 
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FIGURE 5 – PERCENTEGE OF SERIOUSLY INJURED OR FATALITIES BY MOTORCYCLE 
 
Notes: Monthly average of the number of seriously injured or fatalities where the 
accident took place or at the medical center by motorcycle. The black vertical line 
indicates the starting of the treatment.  
 
Figure 5 displays our main result from the difference in difference approach. We see that 
before the treatment (vertical line on November 2013), the trends between Mercedes 
(Treated) and Melo (Control) were the same, while in levels Mercedes had slightly 
higher percentage in the severity of accidents. In the post-treatment period, when helmet 
usage law was enforced in Mercedes, we clearly see a decrease in the probability of 
seriously injured or fatalities in motorcycle accidents relative to Melo. In the next 
sections we will formally estimate the exact impact of the law, using dif-in-dif regression. 
At this point, nonetheless, it is reassuring to see from figure 1 and figure 6 that the policy 
had a clear impact in helmet usage (Figure 1) which led to a reduction in the severity of 
accidents (Figure 6). 
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FIGURE 6 – PERCENTEGE OF UNHARMED, SLIGHTLY INJURED, SERIOUSLY INJURED OR 
FATALITIES BY MOTORCYCLE. 
Panel A. Mercedes 
 
 
Panel B. Melo  
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Notes: Monthly average of the number of unharmed, slightly injured, seriously injured 
or fatalities where the accident took place or at the medical center per motorcycle in the 
period January 2013 – December 2015. 
Figure 6 shows the evolution of the three possible outcomes of a motorcycle accident: 
unharmed, slightly injured and seriously or fataly injured. We illustrate how in the 
locality of Mercedes the monthly average of seriously injured or fatalities decreases after 
November 1st, while this number increases in the locality of Melo in the same period. 
Moreover, the monthly average of slightly injured increases in the locality of Mercedes, 
while the number decreases in the locality of Melo, after the treatment. A change in the 
number of unharmed is not observed in none of the two panels.   
 
4. Methodology 
Our identification strategy is based on a Difference in Difference regression model, 
which compares the proportion of seriously injured and fatalities per motorcycle in each 
city, before and after the intervention period. We estimate the following specification as 
follows: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽(𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑋𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡) +  𝛾𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖 +  𝜕𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 +  𝛿𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝜃ℎ + 𝜇𝑑
+ 𝜌𝑤 +  𝜗𝑦 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
Where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the percentage of seriously injured and fatalities by motorcycle in the 
accidents i produced at time t (where t indicates each hour of the day); MercedesXAfter 
is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 when the accident took place in Mercedes during 
the treatment period; Mercedes is a binary variable equal to 1 when the accident 
occurred in Mercedes city; Holidays is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 
if the day of the accident is school or public holiday. We also include a full set of day-of-
week-specific fixed effects (𝜇𝑑), hour-of-day fixed effects (𝜃ℎ ), week-of-year fixed effects 
(𝜌𝑤) and year fixed effects (𝜗𝑦). 
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5. Results 
 
TABLE 7 – THE IMPACT OF THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW ON THE USE OF HELMET  
Dependent variable: Takes the value 1 if the person in the accident wears a helmet 
and 0 otherwise  
 (1) (2) 
Variables   
Mercedes X After 0.874*** 0.872*** 
 (0.0194) (0.0194) 
Mercedes 0.00972 0.00974 
 (0.0173) (0.0173) 
After 0.0246* 0.0167 
 (0.0133) (0.0260) 
Constant 0.0479*** 0.112*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0402) 
Observations 4,004 4,004 
R-squared 0.743 0.755 
Controls No Yes 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Data: period 2013-2015 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The variable Mercedes X After is a dummy that takes the 
value 1 when the accident took place in Mercedes after November 1st. The variable Mercedes 
equals 1 if the accident took place in Mercedes and After is a dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if the accident occurred after November 1st. Controls include a dummy for school and public 
holidays; a full set of day-of-week-specific fixed effects, hour-of-day fixed effects, week-of-year 
fixed effects and year fixed effects. 
 
Table 7 shows the results of a “First Stage” (the impact of law enforcement on compliance 
with the use of helmets). These estimates are consistent with Figure 1. Helmet usage 
significantly increased from a base of 4.8% in Melo before treatment to 95.6% in 
Mercedes after treatment.  
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TABLE 8 – THE EFFECT OF HELMET USE ON SERIOUS INJURIES AND FATALITIES 
Dependent variable: percentage of seriously injured or fatalities by motorcycle 
 (1) (2) 
Variables   
Mercedes X After -0.0840*** -0.0865*** 
 (0.0302) (0.0307) 
Mercedes 0.0331 0.0378 
 (0.0266) (0.0270) 
After 0.0359* 0.0539 
 (0.0209) (0.0418) 
Constant 0.0793*** 0.142** 
 (0.0186) (0.0666) 
Observations 2,381 2,381 
R-squared 0.006 0.036 
Controls No Yes 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Data: period 2013-2015 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The variable Mercedes X After is a dummy that takes the 
value 1 when the accident took place in Mercedes after November 1st. The variable Mercedes 
equals 1 if the accident took place in Mercedes and After is a dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if the accident occurred after November 1st. Controls include a dummy for school and public 
holidays; a full set of day-of-week-specific fixed effects, hour-of-day fixed effects, week-of-year 
fixed effects and year fixed effects. 
 
In table 8, we show that the treatment has a negative and significant impact on the 
number of seriously injured or fatalities per motorcycle accident. Our reduced form 
estimates show that helmet usage laws reduce the probability of seriously injuries or 
fatalities by 8.7 percentage points (a 57% reduction relative to what would have 
happened in the control city of Melo). 
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TABLE 9 – TESTING THE PARALLEL TRENDS ASSUMPTION 
Dependent variable: percentage of seriously injured or fatalities by motorcycle 
  
Mercedes X Months  0.00282 
 (0.0114) 
Mercedes 0.0253 
 (0.0768) 
Months (coded as 1 to 10) -0.0832 
 (0.0804) 
Constant 1.018 
 (0.811) 
Observations 529 
R-squared 0.093 
Controls Yes 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Date: January-July 2013 
Notes: Each observation corresponds to an accident and the dependent variable is 
calculated as the percentage of seriously injured or fatalities by motorcycle in each accident. 
The analysis uses data for Mercedes and Melo, prior to the start of the helmet control in 
Mercedes (with the 10 months of data being as Months 1 to 10). Standard errors in 
parentheses. Controls include a dummy for school and public holidays; a set of day-of-
week-specific fixed effects, time range-of-day fixed effects and week-of-year fixed effects. 
 
 
We test for parallel trends before the intervention and find that we do not reject the null 
hypotesis of parallel trends, with the coeffcient on the interaction term being close to 
zero (Table 7). We also estimate an alternative regression for testing the parallel trends 
assumtions, employing interaction terms (Mercedes X Month) for each month. We also 
do not reject the null hypotesis of parallel trends. Results are available upon request. 
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TABLE 10 – NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS  
Dependent variable: total number of accidents in a month  
 (1) (2) 
Variables   
Mercedes X After -5.931 -5.931 
 (4.870) (4.930) 
Mercedes -1.300 -1.300 
 (4.138) (4.189) 
After 12.13*** 10.02* 
 (3.443) (5.692) 
Constant 27.10*** 28.89*** 
 (2.926) (5.863) 
Observations 72 72 
R-squared 0.246 0.250 
Controls No Yes 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Data: period 2013-2015 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The variable Mercedes X After is a dummy that takes the 
value 1 when the accident took place in Mercedes after November 1st. The variable Mercedes 
equals 1 if the accident took place in Mercedes and After is a dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if the accident occurred after November 1st. Controls include year fixed effects. 
 
As we express in the introduction, even when it seems intuitive that helmets should 
protect against head injuries, it has been argued that motorcycles helmet use decrease 
rider vision what ends in a major number of accidents. In table 10, we reject that 
hypothesis: we find no significant change in the monthly total number of accidents.  
 
Also, Table 10 provides us with some evidence that the findings about the effect of 
enforcement of helmets on fatalities and serious injuries is not just the result of 
confounders. If the reduction in fatalities and serious injuries were the result of a 
contemporaneous change in the general enforcement of the national law of traffic in 
Mercedes, we should have find that the number of accidents had declined, but it is not 
the case. What we have found is that, even in the presence of the same quantity of 
accidents, the number of fatalities and serious injuries in motorcycles’ accidents 
decreased in Mercedes in comparison to Melo.     
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TABLE 11 – THE EFFECT OF HELMET USE ON SLIGHT INJURIES AND UNHARMED 
Dependent variable:  (1) percentage of slightly injured /  (2) unharmed by motorcycle 
 (1) (2) 
Variables   
Mercedes X After 0.143** -0.0564 
 (0.0607) (0.0508) 
Mercedes -0.208*** 0.155*** 
 (0.0534) (0.0447) 
After -0.148* 0.0511 
 (0.0826) (0.0692) 
Constant 1.110*** 0.0658 
 (0.132) (0.110) 
Observations 2,381 2,381 
R-squared 0.031 0.050 
Controls Yes Yes 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Data: period 2013-2015 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The variable Mercedes X After is a dummy that takes the 
value 1 when the accident took place in Mercedes after November 1st,, 2013. The variable 
Mercedes equals 1 if the accident took place in Mercedes and After is a dichotomous variable 
that equals 1 if the accident occurred after November 1st, 2013. Controls include a dummy for 
school and public holidays; a full set of day-of-week-specific fixed effects, hour-of-day fixed 
effects, week-of-year fixed effects and year fixed effects. 
 
In Table 8, we had observed that using helmet reduces the severity of the injury, while 
Table 11 reports that the mentioned reduction of the severity goes hand in hand with: 
(a)  an increase of the slightly injured (column 1), and (b) no changes in the number of 
unharmed (column 2).  
The overall picture is that while the number of accidents (Table 10) and the number of 
unharmed (Table 11, col.2) remained constant, the policy reduced severe and fatal 
accidents (Table 8) and shifted them to slightly injured ones (Table 11, col.1).  
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TABLE 12 – PLACEBO TEST: THE EFFECT OF HELMET USE ON SERIOUS INJURIES AND 
FATALITIES IN CAR ACCIDENTS  
Dependent variable: percentage of seriously injured or fatalities in car accidents 
  
 (1) (2) 
Variables   
Mercedes X After -0.00151 -0.00222 
 (0.00945) (0.00968) 
Mercedes 0.00365 0.00576 
 (0.00849) (0.00871) 
After -0.00168 0.00553 
 (0.00649) (0.0130) 
Constant 0.00549 -0.00559 
 (0.00585) (0.0191) 
Observations 1,803 1,803 
R-squared 0.000 0.034 
Controls No Yes 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Data: period 2013-2015 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The variable Mercedes X After is a dummy that takes the 
value 1 when the accident took place in Mercedes after November 1st, 2013. The variable 
Mercedes equals 1 if the accident took place in Mercedes and After is a dichotomous variable 
that equals 1 if the accident occurred after November 1st, 2013. Controls include a dummy for 
school and public holidays; a full set of day-of-week-specific fixed effects, hour-of-day fixed 
effects, week-of-year fixed effects and year fixed effects. 
 
The enforcement of the use of helmet since November 1st, 2013 should not have any 
impact on the seriousness of injuries nor on fatalities in individuals driving cars in traffic 
accidents. Thus Table 12 provides a placebo test, and it confirms this hypothesis. Also, 
Table 12 offers another piece of evidence that our findings in favor of the helmet are not 
just the result of confounders like a contemporaneous variation in other traffic laws: if it 
were the case, the fatalities and serious injuries in car accidents should have decreased. 
Also we sought for any press news about other changes in the application of traffic laws 
in Mercedes and Melo in the sample period, but we have found no news.    
6. Discussion 
Motorcycle crashes account for a disproportionate number of motor vehicle deaths and 
injuries in many developing countries. Resistance to legislation on motorcycle helmets 
still coexists with debate on the effectiveness of motorcycle helmets in reducing 
morbidity and mortality. Using data for Uruguay, we show that it is possible to change 
habits regarding the usage of helmets. The enforcement of the law increased helmet 
usage from less than 10% to more than 90% in just one month. Using a difference in 
difference framework we have exploited this exogenous variation and found that 
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wearing a helmet reduces the percentage of seriously injured and fatalities in motorcycle 
accidents. Our reduced form estimates suggest that helmet usage laws reduce the 
probability of serious injuries or fatalities by 8.7 percentage points (a 57% reduction 
relative to the control group). 
Helmet laws lead to a loss in personal utility that is non-trivial. Because these costs 
cannot be easily quantified, it is not possible to credibly compare the costs and benefits 
of these regulations. However, our results do make it possible to frame the empirical 
magnitudes of the benefits of helmet laws in a way that may be useful for informed 
policy discourse. More specifically, in 2015, the five Uruguayan Departments with a 
helmet law compliance under 70 percent –that is, the Departments where more than 30 
percent of the seriously injured or fatalities were not using helmets- experienced 985 
seriously injured motorcyclist or fatalities. A quite conservative estimate for the value of 
a statistical life is $ 2 million dollars (Dee, 2009) and for the value of health costs is $ 7,437 
dollars (Paolillo et al., 2016]). Considering that one in ten seriously injured ends in 
fatality and that a mandatory helmet law would reduce seriously injured and fatalities 
by 57% percent, the annual benefit of avoiding 561 seriously injured lives would be 
roughly $ 116 million dollars.  
 
Inspired in Dee (2009) approach to monetary benefits analysis, we do the following 
estimate. On the cost side, there were roughly 459,000 registered motorcycles in the cited 
five Uruguayan Departments. Roughly 70 percent motorcyclists in these states wear 
helmets. Therefore, approximately 115,000 motorcyclists would be constrained by the 
universal expansion of helmet laws. Combining these results, the seriously injured 
saving effect of helmet laws would amount to $ 1,009 dollars benefit annually for each 
motorcyclist constrained by the enforcement of the law. Assuming a real discount rate 
of 5 percent and a 30-year time horizon (Dee, 2009), the present discounted value of this 
social benefit is roughly $ 17,000 dollars for each motorcyclist who would be required to 
wear a helmet because of a legal requirement. These figures provide a rough sense of the 
benefits of motorcycle-helmet laws in order to compare them with their social costs. It 
should be noted that these calculations ignored additional direct benefits (lost wages of 
the victims, physical therapy, rehabilitation, prosthetic devices, and lost lives in case of 
fatalities) and the external benefits of helmet use (legal fees and court costs, value travel 
delay for all road users, cost of workplace disruption that are due to the absence of a 
worker).  
 
Dee (2009) suggests that the tension between public-health advocates and motorcyclists 
that emphasize the value of individual choice would diminish if they agree to a 
regulatory compromise that mandates helmet use (subject to secondary enforcement) 
but only for those who have not paid a Pigouvian fee that reflects the external costs of 
not using a helmet. Alternatively, the regulatory fee for non-use of a helmet could be a 
non-pecuniary act that makes a contribution to public health (e.g., becoming an organ 
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donor). Alternative policies like this may provide a politically feasible and normatively 
attractive way to balance the external costs of not wearing a motorcycle helmet with 
other health-related or fiscal benefits. 
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